with commonly available statistics. Measuring public spending entails tracking not only outlays from public insurance coverage (such as Medicaid and Medicare), but also implicit tax subsidies (such as those for employer-sponsored insurance), public grants to providers (such as Medicaid Disproportionate Share payments), and private premium payments for public coverage (such as Part B Medicare premiums). Because no single data source provides all of this information, in this chapter we combine aggregate measures from the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA) with microdata from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) . The second section of the chapter adjusts NHEA estimates to provide a historical look at the public-private spending mix since 1960. The third section presents a "benefi t incidence analysis" of public spending in 2010 by age, poverty level, insurance coverage, and health status, and across ACA-relevant subgroups on the eve of reform.
Aggregate Public Spending on Health Care
The NHEA, produced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), combine data on provider revenues and administrative claims to produce aggregate estimates of US health spending by service type and payment source (CMS 2014a) . We modify the NHEA estimates in two ways. First, we reclassify as private the portion of Medicare paid for by private premiums (these payments are voluntary, and thus more akin to a "user fee" than to a tax). 1 Second, we shift to public spending the portion of private spending that is defrayed by tax expenditures.
Unfortunately, we are aware of no consistent and comprehensive time series for tax expenditures, and published tax expenditure estimates can be only imperfectly reconciled. For 1987 For , 1996 For , 2007 For , and 2010 the tax subsidy estimates are from calculations performed by one or more of this chapter's authors, providing a reasonably consistent and comprehensive set of adjustments. 2 We describe the 2010 estimates in greater detail below, but our basic objective is to include: (a) federal income, state income, and payroll tax expenditures for employer-sponsored insurance ([ESI] ; subsidies for employer contributions and for tax-exempt employee contributions); 1. Medicare premiums paid by households for 1987 to 2010 are from NHEA "sponsor" estimates (CMS 2014b), supplemented with pre-1987 data on Medicare fi nancing from Trustee Reports. Although we use NHEA sponsor estimates for Medicare premiums, note that our public/private estimates diff er from NHEA sponsor estimates in several key respects. First, we exclude nonpatient revenue. Second, we count Medicare as public, whether it is funded by payroll taxes or general revenues (excluding only the portion paid by premiums). Third, we treat all employer-sponsored insurance as private, including that for government employees. Lastly, we account for tax expenditures. As a result, our estimates of the public share are substantially larger than those in the NHEA sponsor estimates.
2. Estimates for 1996 are from Selden and Moeller (2000) , which is also our source for unpublished 1987 estimates. For 2002, estimates are from Selden and Sing (2008) (see also Sheils and Haught 2004) . Note that tax expenditures that reduce health care spending (such as property tax exemptions or exemptions from ad valorem sales taxes) eff ectively increase the total amount of health care spending by a small percentage.
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(b) the excess medical care itemized deduction; (c) the tax preference for self-employment health insurance; (d) tax preferences for (health care) fl exible spending accounts and health savings accounts; (e) the exemption of medical care from sales taxation; and (f) a range of smaller tax expenditures, such as those available to nonprofi t providers. Tax expenditure estimates were constructed assuming that all preferences were removed simultaneously (rather than, say, allowing the excess medical care deduction to grow in response to removal of the ESI and self-employment preferences). We fi ll gaps between 1987 and 2012 by interpolation and extrapolation, building on estimates of the ESI subsidy for current workers from Miller and Selden (2013) , Selden and Gray (2006) , and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT, various years, available for 1967-present, but only covering the federal income tax portion of the ESI subsidy), as well as estimates in Sheils and Hogan (1999) and Sheils and Haught (2004) . For earlier years, we construct estimates that are as consistent as possible from Feldstein and Allison (1970) and Helms (2008) , fi lling any remaining gaps back to 1960 using Barro and Redlick's historical average tax rates (National Bureau of Economic Research 2012) and NHEA estimates of private insurance premiums. Due to the variety of data sources used to construct our time series for tax expenditures, our results should be viewed as an approximation of how public spending has evolved over time. Figure 14 .1 clearly shows both the remarkable rise in real per capita spending and the rising public share. Combining public outlays with implicit public [1979] [1980] [1981] period at an average of 15.5 percent of total health care spending, declining thereafter to approximately 13 percent at present. This decline is due primarily to lower marginal tax rates. Together with the fact that private spending itself is a declining share of total spending, declines in marginal rates more than off set the shift toward the use of Section 125 plans to exempt employee premium contributions from taxation. In contrast, public outlays have quite steadily increased as a share of US health care spending, even after the initial introduction of Medicare and Medicaid.
Benefi t Incidence of Public Spending on Health Care
Given that the public sector accounts for well over half of all US spending on health care, a natural next question concerns the incidence of benefi ts from this spending across key socioeconomic groups. To answer this, we move beyond aggregate NHEA estimates, updating and extending the "benefi t incidence analysis" for 2002 in Selden and Sing (2008) . Benefi t incidence analysis is a "statutory" method of accounting in a simplifi ed manner for the distribution of benefi ts from public spending (Selden and Wasylenko 1992) . Public programs are assumed to confer benefi ts in proportion to services or payments received. We do not attempt to measure the risk-reducing benefi ts associated with public insurance or the cash-equivalent valuation by recipients for benefi ts received, and we ignore shifting across generations and throughout the economy-our rationale being that we seek to provide a complete overview of a very complex sector. 3 Our starting point is the MEPS household survey sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The MEPS contains individual and household-level data on health expenditures and use, health insurance coverage, health status, and a wide range of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for a nationally representative sample of households in the civilian, noninstitutionalized population (Cohen 1997) .
Although MEPS is an ideal starting point for analyzing the distribution of public spending, no household survey, by itself, can support a complete 3. For an analysis of how alternative assumptions regarding wage formation might aff ect the tax subsidy incidence, see Selden and Bernard (2004) . For incidence analyses of Medicare's benefi ts net of payments, see McClellan and Skinner (2006) and Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006) . With respect to valuing in-kind benefi ts, see Wolfe and Moffi tt (1991) .
You are reading copyrighted material published by University of Chicago Press. Unauthorized posting, copying, or distributing of this work except as permitted under U.S. copyright law is illegal and injures the author and publisher. distributional analysis. First, household data suff er from underreporting, and high-cost cases may be underrepresented. Second, household respondents cannot be expected to report certain types of spending, such as administrative costs or some hospital payments not tied to patient events. Third, although MEPS provides much of the data to compute tax expenditures, such subsidies are implicit by nature and thus not readily reportable by household respondents.
To remedy the fi rst gap, we begin with 2007 NHEA benchmarks that have been aligned with the type of service and source of payment defi nitions in MEPS and adjusted to exclude spending for the institutionalized, active-duty military and foreigners visiting the United States-groups not included in MEPS (Bernard et al. 2012) . We age these benchmarks forward to our analysis year, 2010, and then align MEPS by type of service and source of payment. Gaps are closed in part by upweighting high-cost cases and, in part, by scaling reported amounts (Bernard, Selden, and Pylypchuk 2014) .
Next we allocate amounts in NHEA that were outside the scope of MEPS. Personal care services are allocated in proportion to home health care spending. Administrative costs are allocated in proportion to benefi ts received, with any premiums paid by households for public coverage netted out of public benefi ts received. Medicaid and Medicare Disproportionate Share payments and state and local funding for public hospitals are allocated using MEPS data on uncompensated care. 4 For completeness, we also allocate: research spending in proportion to prescription drug spending, investment in structures and equipment in proportion to hospital use, and public health spending evenly across the population. Throughout the analysis, health insurance provided by public employers to their employees is considered private spending (a noncash form of compensation in lieu of higher cash wages), rather than public insurance.
Finally, we estimate a comprehensive array of tax expenditures. To simulate the tax subsidy from exclusion of employer-sponsored insurance premiums from federal income, state income, and Social Security and Medicare payroll taxation, we combine marginal tax rates (simulated using the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model) 5 with MEPS HC data on employee premium contributions and employer premium contributions (imputed using regressions estimated with the MEPS Insurance Component survey of employers). 6 We also simulate the medical expense deduction and the exemption of health care spending from most, but not all, state 4. The MEPS uncompensated care was constructed by comparing event payments with charges that were adjusted for reasonable discounts.
5. Feenberg and Coutts (1993) . TAXSIM version 8 was used (accessed September 1, 2013, at http:// www .nber .org /taxsim).
6. Each family's ESI tax subsidies were allocated across policyholders and their covered dependents in proportion to spending paid for by private insurance (or pro rata across covered persons in families that had no care paid for by private insurance).
and local sales taxation. Finally, we allocate to MEPS individuals national estimates of a variety of smaller tax subsidies, such as the tax exemption of nonprofi t hospitals (Bernard, Selden, and Pylypchuk 2015) . All diff erences discussed in the text are statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent level, and all standard errors and statistical tests refl ect the complex design of MEPS.
Aggregate Results
The top row of table 14.1 presents the incidence of benefi ts from public spending on health care in aggregate. Overall, public spending accounted for 57.6 percent of total spending on health care (a slightly lower percentage than in fi gure 14.1, due to the exclusion of active-duty military and persons residing in institutions). We report expenditures in fi ve subcategories: "Medicaid and CHIP" includes payments for patient care and administration costs, net of premiums paid by households, for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and a small number of similar state-funded programs. "Medicare" is defi ned similarly. These two categories comprise 67.6 percent of all public outlays. "Other public general" includes the NHEA categories of public health, public investment in structures and equipment, Medicare Graduate Medical Education, and public research-amounts that tend to benefi t broad groups of the population and may have public goods attributes. All remaining public outlays are grouped in "other public targeted." This includes other public third-party programs such as the Veterans Administration, workers' compensation, and the MEPS expenditure categories of Other Federal and Other State and Local, all of which entail payments linked to specifi c benefi ciaries (i.e., payments that can be measured in MEPS). The "targeted" category also includes Medicaid and Medicare Disproportionate Share payments, which are payments to hospitals based on their caseloads of lower-income populations. 7 Finally, the "tax expenditures" category includes all of the tax preferences mentioned above, accounting for just over one-quarter (26.6 percent) of all public expenditures on health care (within the civilian noninstitutionalized population).
Age Groups
Public spending in 2010 was strongly related to age, with children from birth to age eighteen receiving $1,809 on average, versus $3,539 for adults age nineteen to sixty-four and $9,678 for seniors (all amounts in 2010 dollars). In part, these diff erences mirror the overall age gradient in health care spending. Despite the large diff erences in average public spending between children and seniors, the public share of total spending for seniors (65.2 percent) 7. For instance, Medicare DSH is tied to hospital caseloads of persons receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Medicaid DSH payments are targeted at hospitals treating indigent populations.
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188.1 828 (74) 371 (50) 406 (37) 475 (7) 1,374 (20) 3,539 (105) 52 (280) 1,148 (160) 1,010 (165) 470 (16) 120 (14) 6,070 (437) 79.9 (1.9) 100-199% FPL 57.1 1,033 (86) 1,542 (164) 544 (91) 486 (12) 492 (21) 4,196 (230) 67 (1.7) 200-399% FPL 93.0 441 (69) 964 (96) 331 (52) 455 (8) 1,003 (18) 3,262 (136) 53 is very similar to that of children (63.9 percent). On a percentage basis, adults age nineteen to sixty-four receive less than children or seniors (public spending is 52.8 percent of total spending for this group). The lower public shares for adults age nineteen to sixty-four is not surprising given that Medicare provides nearly universal coverage for seniors and given that public coverage expansions in recent years, prior to the ACA, have been disproportionately targeted at children (Medicaid and CHIP). Medicare and Medicaid/CHIP together comprise only 17.9 percent of total spending for adults under age sixty-fi ve (calculated from table as [$828 + $371]/$6,703) versus 30.2 percent for children and 47.8 percent for seniors.
Poverty Level
Table 14.1 also shows the incidence of public benefi ts by family income as a percentage of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). Not surprisingly, Medicaid/CHIP spending was targeted at lower-income groups. In contrast, the remaining categories of public health care outlays were somewhat more evenly distributed, and tax subsidies strongly favored high-income families. Overall, public spending accounted for 79.9 percent of total health care among those under 100 percent of FPL. Perhaps more surprisingly, even among those at or above four times the poverty line the public share was 46.8 percent.
Health Status
The top panel of table 14.2 shows the incidence of public benefi ts by self (or proxy) reported health status. 8 Our results highlight the extent to which the public sector targets those with the greatest health care needs. This is particularly true for public outlays on third-party reimbursement for care (i.e., Medicaid, CHIP, Medicare, and other public targeted). It is not surprising that public outlays would be highest for those in fair or poor health; these groups also have the highest private expenditures. More noteworthy is that the public share rises as health status deteriorates, so that the public sector in the United States disproportionately cares for those with greatest health risks. 9 8. Persons with missing health status were excluded from the analysis. 9. Our methodology generally follows that of Selden and Sing quite closely; however, one difference concerns the treatment of private spending in public share calculations. Selden and Sing measure the benefi t of private insurance using premiums paid by households (or employers). In this chapter, the benefi t of private insurance is based on paid claims (plus an implied load). This is more symmetric with our use of claims paid by public insurers (plus net administrative costs) to value the benefi t of public spending on coverage. This refi nement has negligible eff ect on our public share computations based on age, income, insurance, or ACA-relevant groups. It does, however, improve our public share estimates across health risk, lowering the public share estimates for those with high health risks.
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Insurance Coverage
The bottom panel of table 14.2 shows the incidence of public benefi ts by insurance coverage. Not surprisingly, public expenditures are largest on average ($19,291) for dual eligibles (persons ever covered by Medicare and Medicaid). Also not surprising is that the public share for persons ever covered by Medicaid/CHIP (but not Medicare or private) is very high (91.6 percent). More noteworthy is that the public share is just over 50 percent for the full-year uninsured (though the absolute amount, $1,124, is small relative to other insurance groups). Even for persons with private coverage during the year the public share is 42.6 percent, due to $1,678 in tax expenditures and $436 in other public general (both per covered person). Subgroups   Table 14 .3 shows the incidence of public benefi ts for adults age nineteen to sixty-four by ACA-relevant subgroups. 10 For simplicity, we focus on US citizens who are never enrolled in Medicare and who do not receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 11 We identify six groups. The fi rst consists of persons enrolled at any point during the year in Medicaid (or, in a few cases, CHIP). Even after excluding "dual" Medicaid/Medicare enrollees and persons receiving SSI, this group currently benefi ts from extensive public expenditures ($4,780 on average), with a public share of 83.3 percent.
ACA-Relevant
The second and third groups consist of persons with modifi ed adjusted gross income (MAGI) under 138 percent of FPL. In group 2 are adults in expansion states who would be eligible for Medicaid as of January 1, 2014 (if not earlier). 12 Group 3 consists of adults in nonexpansion states who will not in general be eligible for Medicaid. 13 Neither group receives a particularly high benefi t from public spending on health care; average amounts for groups 2 and 3 are $1,536 and $1,566, respectively. 10. Because income (and thus eligibility) can fl uctuate during the year, this portion of our analysis focuses on income measured as of the fi rst interview during 2010 (and we subset the full-year MEPS sample to those in MEPS as of that interview).
11. The ACA main coverage provisions do not apply to persons with Medicare or who receive SSI-related Medicaid coverage for disability. While some ACA coverage provisions apply to some noncitizens (those who are documented and who meet residency tests), immigration status is not measured in MEPS and must be inferred probabilistically based on a number of observed characteristics. Including noncitizens would have very little eff ect on the estimates in table 14.3.
12. Some adults in these states were eligible for, but not enrolled in Medicaid under pre-ACA rules, and some lived in states that implemented ACA-related expansions prior to the start of 2014.
13. Included in this group are some adults who were eligible for, but not enrolled in Medicaid under prereform rules. Note that in nonexpansion states, persons with MAGI between 100 percent FPL and 138 percent FPL are eligible for subsidized exchange coverage (if they lack access to aff ordable ESI), so that this group is excluded from group 3. Note also that in nonexpansion states the change from pre-ACA Medicaid income counting rules to MAGI and the elimination of asset tests may make some current enrollees ineligible, while conferring eligibility on some adults who would previously have been ineligible.
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Group 5 consists of persons with MAGI over 138 percent of FPL who are off ered coverage through their own job (or whose spouse is off ered coverage)-the off ers making them (in most cases) ineligible for subsidized marketplace coverage even if their MAGIs are under 400 percent of FPL. As has been well-documented in prior studies regarding the regressive incidence of the ESI tax subsidy, this group has access to aff ordable coverage (at least for single coverage), and it receives approximately double the public benefi t on average ($2,905) compared to adults in groups 2, 3, 4-who generally have lower incomes and whose public benefi t ranges from $1,389 to $1,566.
Looking at these fi rst fi ve groups, benefi t incidence analysis clarifi es the extent to which the ACA, as designed, targeted Medicaid expansions and private coverage subsidies at groups in-between Medicaid enrollees and those with access to ESI. As designed, the ACA would help to level what was, pre-ACA, a U-shaped pattern of benefi ts across these groups (see, for instance, Rennane and Steuerle 2011) . The actual eff ects of the ACA on this distribution of public benefi ts will depend, for groups 2 and 4, on their take up of coverage and their resulting use of medical care. For group 3 the question is whether their states decide to adopt the ACA Medicaid expansions.
The fi nal group consists of persons with MAGI over 400 percent of FPL who lack their own or spousal ESI off ers. Compared to groups 2-4, this group currently receives approximately the same level of public outlays and nearly twice as much in tax expenditure (refl ecting in part tax preferences for self-employment and retiree coverage). Because of this group's higher income, it was not targeted by the ACA-though members of this group may be aff ected by ACA provisions regarding guaranteed issue, community rating, and other reforms in the nongroup market.
Limitations
There are several noteworthy limitations of our study. First, fi gure 14.1 presents published NHEA estimates that we have modifi ed using tax expen-14. The ACA also specifi es that such coverage must have an actuarial value of at least 60 percent and a single coverage premium under 9.5 percent of MAGI. Also, a spouse's off er would not aff ect a person's subsidy eligibility unless the person can be covered through the spouse's plan. The MEPS does not provide data on actuarial value and only observes employee contributions and coverage of other family members for plans actually chosen. Given that most ESI plans meet these tests for most employees, we focus solely on own and spousal off ers in defi ning group 4 for table 14.3.
diture estimates drawn from a variety of published and unpublished sources. These tax expenditure estimates can be only imperfectly reconciled and interpolated, raising caveats regarding the consistency of the resulting time series. Second, our incidence analysis focuses on average spending by subgroups, and we do not measure the risk-reducing benefi ts associated with public insurance or the cash-equivalent valuation by recipients for benefi ts received. Third, the ultimate benefi ciaries of public spending may be different in some cases from those we identify. For instance, public spending on behalf of seniors may off set private transfers from (or increase bequests to) their children (Sloan, Zhang, and Wang 2002) . Fourth, tax expenditure estimates were constructed under the assumption that employers shift the burden of employer premium contributions to workers based on the plans they take up (rather than based on their ability to pay or their underlying health risks), and, while this likely has little eff ect on aggregate estimates (Miller and Selden 2013) , alternative assumptions might aff ect the measured incidence of ESI tax subsidies across workers (Selden and Bernard 2004) . Finally, persons in institutions (and active-duty military) are outside the scope of MEPS and thus were not included in our incidence analysis.
Discussion
The estimates presented in this chapter provide basic background information on the overall public share of health care spending, its growth over time, and the distribution of public benefi ts across key population subgroups. Overall, the public share of US spending on health care in 2012 totaled 59.2 percent when we include tax expenditures as a form of public spending (and when we treat household-paid premiums for public coverage as being akin to a user fee). Our historical analysis documents a long-term trend toward higher public shares in total spending, with growth in public outlays representing the primary driver over time (versus tax expenditures, which peaked as a percentage of health care spending in the years 1979-1981).
Our incidence results for 2010 show that the distribution of public spending across age, poverty, insurance, and health status have not changed since 2002 (Selden and Sing 2008) . Publicly fi nanced health care, both in magnitude and as a percentage of total spending, is largest for seniors, while benefi ts as a percentage of total spending are lowest for adults age nineteen to sixty-four. Moreover, even though it was public outlays, more than tax expenditures, that drove the rising public share of total health care spending from 1960 to present, our incidence estimates for 2010 show that all income groups (classifi ed by poverty level) share in the benefi ts of public spending. Even among families with incomes above 400 percent of the poverty line, public spending accounted for nearly half of total spending. This chapter also presents benefi t incidence estimates for ACA-relevant groups of nonsenior adults. Our results highlight the relatively low level of pre-ACA public benefi ts fl owing to adults under 400 percent of FPL who neither were enrolled in Medicaid nor had access to ESI-precisely those adults the ACA targets for expanded access to government-subsidized, aff ordable coverage.
In future work, "benefi t incidence analysis" can provide a valuable tool to evaluate ACA-related changes in public spending. The Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO 2013) shows that ACA provisions to expand health insurance will increase the public share of total spending, 15 and an important question for public policy will be the extent to which the ACA evens the distribution of public benefi ts across adults. Furthermore, tracking the benefi t incidence of public spending can provide a useful backdrop for the ongoing debate over further steps the country might take on entitlements and tax policy to ensure long-term fi scal stability.
